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Sunday, November 3, 2013

Review of Agricultural Warehouse Receipting Initiatives in Ethiopia



Wondwossen’s Note:

The following report on Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX) and warehouse receipting initiatives in Ethiopia is an output of a cross-country review of agricultural warehouse receipt systems in Eastern African countries and their role in facilitating the development of commodity exchanges. The review is funded by the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) and carried out by the University of Greenwich Natural Resources Institute (NRI), UK.

The Ethiopia case study was conducted between February and June 2012 by J. Coulter Consulting Ltd., based in Bromley, UK, working under contract to University of Greenwich. It attempts to make a before-and-after-ECX comparison and assesses the experience of ECX/WRS in terms of: 1) enabling environment, 2) strategic coherence, and 3) operational arrangements, and makes certain recommendations.

“Due to the short duration of the assignment and limited availability of information, some important questions remain to be answered,” says the author, Jonathan Coulter, in the report, adding “Nevertheless I believe that it throws some light on a subject about which there has so far been little in the way of independent research.”

Below is the summary section of the report. The entire document may be accessed through the link provided at the bottom of this post.

What are your thoughts? Please use the comment box or send emails to poorfarmer@gmail.com.

The author may be reached at jcoulter01@yahoo.com.
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Review of Agricultural Warehouse Receipting Initiatives in Ethiopia

by Jonathan Coulter
J. Coulter Consulting Ltd., Bromley, UK

October 2013

Ethiopia’s agricultural sector has grown rapidly over the last decade, but the country still has major pockets of chronic and transitory food insecurity.  The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has embarked on an ambitious Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2011-15, with a view to doubling production of key crops and reducing the number of safety net beneficiaries from 7.8 to 1.8 million households.  Ethiopia has for long been Africa’s leading coffee producer with approximately half of the crop going for domestic consumption and the remainder for export.  Over the last decade, the country has experienced rapid growth in its agricultural exports, with sesame seed and pulses approaching coffee as the leading items in volume terms.

GoE is also engaged in a massive programme of infrastructure investment, and is financing much of this and the GTP by requiring the banks to purchase low-interest bonds.   Government banks, notably the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), dominate the banking sector and take a leading role in this, and stringent requirements have now been placed on private banks.

Lending against the security of warehoused commodities is not new in Ethiopia, since have for long provided traders and Government enterprises with merchandise loans.  The banks carry out their own surveillance and do not employ independent collateral managers as do banks elsewhere in Africa.  There have been few problems with these loans and repayment levels are reported at around 99%.  From 2001, GoE attempted to develop a formal warehouse receipt system (WRS) by establishing a system of open access (or public) warehousing to help farmers gain from seasonal arbitrage, with support of CFC.  In 2003, it passed a Warehouse Receipts System Law (Proclamation) and went on to establish a regulatory unit at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD).  This subsequently licensed eight warehouses belonging to the parastatal Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE), and attempted to persuade cooperatives, commercial farmers and others to deposit wheat and maize, but the response was negligible.

This MoARD-regulated initiative ended in 2007 with the establishment of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) which then became GoE’s preferred instrument for implementing the WRS.  Little information is available on the earlier initiative, so the most meaningful way to appraise the added value of the warehouse receipts systems in Ethiopia is to make a before-and-after-ECX comparison.  The author has proceeded on this basis.

ECX is an unusual exchange in that it is fully Government-owned, while at the same time having a mainly private membership, including trading members who can trade on their own account, and intermediary members who can also trade on account of others (as brokers).  It has also enjoyed very substantial donor funding (estimates range to more than US$ 40 million), including the payment of salaries for staff with extensive international experience in the financial sector.

ECX started as a cash (i.e. spot) exchange with a number of delivery locations (i.e. warehousing sites with weighbridges, testing laboratories and offices) located around the country where sellers would deposit all goods, and have them graded, prior to sale across the exchange floor.  It was entitled both to operate its own warehouses and to certify third party warehouse operators, though so far it has only done the former.  All stocks are stored on a commingled basis, by grade, which is a departure from international practice which typically allows the lots of high value commodities (like Arabica coffee) to be segregated or identity preserved by depositor.  Title is transferred to buyers using electronic warehouse receipts (e-WRs) that ECX itself issues and holds in its central depository, and ECX has established a system of performance guarantees including a settlement guarantee fund of over Birr 100 million (about US$ 5.8 million), made with member contributions.

After an unsuccessful attempt to attract cereals trade, ECX switched its attention to coffee, assisted by GoE which mandated the entire coffee crop (for export and domestic consumption) to be traded through the ECX trading floor, in place of auctions in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.  However, cooperative unions and large commercial farms have a special derogation that entitles them to export direct.  The volume of trade grew vertiginously, and in September 2010 two other export commodities (sesame and pea beans) were similarly mandated.   There are now 17 delivery locations and about 55 warehouses.  By the third year of operations (FY 2010/11), the volumes of commodities traded had reached 509 thousand tons, of which 51% was coffee, 41% sesame, 7% pea beans and 1% maize, the latter being the only non-mandated commodity.  Net earnings were reported at Birr 50 million (about $3 million), and the return on capital employed at 55%.  During 2011/12, there was a fall in the world coffee market and a crisis in the Ethiopian industry, resulting in the retention of stocks and a very large drop of sales through ECX.  

More or less coincidentally with the establishment of ECX, GoE has required that farmers sell these mandated crops through primary transaction centres in each Kabele (lowest administrative unit), so that they can be purchased by rural traders (suppliers, colloquially known as acrabis) and cooperatives for delivery to ECX warehouses.

In September 2010 ECX started a warehouse receipt financing pilot with sesame and pea beans, with technical support and capacity building from the International Finance Corporation (IFC).  However this has been strictly an adjunct to ECX’s trading floor and due to the short expiry date on the warehouse receipts (30-90 days depending on the crop) does not allow for intra-seasonal or long-term storage.  Since February 2011, the Government-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) has advanced about $1.50 million to 42 borrowers against stocks of sesame and pea beans in three separate storage locations.  Over 90% of borrowers have so far been suppliers, though ECX believes there is also major potential with the cooperative unions.  This start has been made despite the NBE Bills Directive requiring the private banks to buy Government bonds, and which means that only GoE-owned banks can afford to give WR loans.   Notwithstanding, the WRS pilot is well regarded by private banks that see the warehouses as highly secure and because the scheme allows them to access a clientele they cannot reach with conventional merchandise loans.  One potential snag with the WRS for cash crops is the lack of a clear seasonal carry structure (increasing price trend), which increases the risk that borrowers will experience financial losses.  In view of this, they need better market intelligence to manage the speculative risks involved.

ECX has had difficulty in gaining traction with food commodities, and this is attributed to lower than expected production, lack of on-site cleaning facilities, a high percentage of reject, a Government export ban and traders’ fear that a formal system like ECX will bring them under the purview of the tax authorities.  Despite this, Government plans to mandate the trading of maize and wheat through the primary transaction centres and ECX, in 2012/13, and intends to progressively extend the system to other crops.

In examining ECX, and the WRS which it has ushered in, the author identified a range of pluses and minuses.  However, on a short study of this kind and given the availability of information, it was not feasible to attempt an overall quantification benefits to farmers, of economic gains or the cost-effectiveness of the system.   For this reason, he limited himself to a more modest assessment, against the criteria of enabling environment, strategic coherence and operational arrangements, and a few recommendations which flow from this analysis.

1.       Re the enabling environment, there is mixed picture.  GoE has provided very determined support for the development of ECX and its warehousing system, backed up by the willingness to enforce compliance with applicable law and regulations.  GoE has moreover been quick to pass enabling legislation for warehouse receipts, giving banks full confidence in the instrument.   However, in some respects GoE’s approach appears to have been too determined, taking insufficient account of strategic issues (see below), and with current plans to mandate more than 1 million tons of maize and wheat, an action likely to prove problematic in view of; (a) the difficulty of policing flows of basic foods, and; (b) the expected overload on ECX’s already over-stretched delivery system.  The development of reliable power supplies and internet connectivity lags behind the expansion of ECX’s delivery structure, resulting in major delays in unloading and loading commodities in certain locations, while some aspects of the enabling environment (notably the discouragement of differential trading) increase the price risk that exporters face and make it more difficult for them to access bank financing.  At the same time, the GoE requirement that higher grades of coffee be exported is the source of a large-scale black-market, whereby exportable grades are diverted for domestic consumption, by-passing ECX.

2.       Re strategic coherence, there is widespread consensus that the new system has made the internal market more transparent and improved enforcement of contracts between suppliers and exporters.  However the new market structure is adding further logistical steps (at the level of primary transaction centres and exchange warehouses) creating new costs in the value-chain.  At the same time, coffee exporters are finding it difficult to cover their short positions, and this is contributing to problems of contractual default at the export level. 

ECX is at odds with the current trend in the international coffee market, as the mandatory market structure diminishes traceability and thereby reduces the premiums that Ethiopia can earn for its coffee, at a cost which may be upwards of US$26 million per annum.  A fresh approach focusing on increased agricultural productivity, adoption of the most efficient pulping technology and maximizing quality premiums in the international market could potentially earn Ethiopia much larger sums, in the hundreds of millions of dollars per annum.

3.       As regards warehouse receipting, the Tanzanian experience with coffee offers some useful pointers to Ethiopia.  It is a voluntary system whereby Government or its nominee licenses privately owned dry mills to act as one-stop-shops, and carry out a range of activities (storage, financing, dry milling, classification and grading) in single locations.   The system is logistically efficient and allows for traceability, with origin coffee being handled on an identity-preserved basis.

4.       The plan to mandate the trading of maize and wheat through primary transaction centres and ECX is highly questionable given the capacity limitations and congestion that already exists at ECX delivery points, and the difficult in policing the system.  The easiest way to develop exchange trading and warehouse receipting for cereals is by using demand-side stimulation, as described above, but without mandating the system on private players.  As is suggested in the case of coffee, ECX would not need to run the warehouses, but simply accredit suitable companies to carry out this function and ensure their compliance with the relevant regulations.  Unlike the present arrangements, warehouses should be one-stop-shops with primary processing facilities (notably cleaning), and with sufficient capacity for seasonal storage (i.e. upwards of six months).  Indeed it probably makes logistical sense for ECX to move towards one-stop-shop warehouses for all commodities, whereby the commodities are cleaned, dried or otherwise processed to standards required by end-users and export markets.  Government could also develop the grain trading side of ECX through supply-side stimulation, in this case using ECX to auction off stocks of imported wheat (such as it imported in 2010/11) and other commodities.

5.       Re operational effectiveness, ECX’s greatest strength lies in the operational arrangements of its trading system and delivery locations.  Moreover, its warehouse receipts inspire confidence among the banks, avoiding the distrust which has held back warehousing initiatives in some other countries.  Running warehouses has provided ECX with a wealth of experience it could put to good use by establishing an accreditation and inspection service for private warehouses. At the same time, it has significant logistical problems resulting from a mixture of internet and power failures, and shortage of physical capacity (warehouses and weighbridges).  This makes it difficult to handle large volumes of mandated crops, and results in large tailbacks at certain sites; in the worst cases lorries queue for over 10 days.  The planned mandating of grain crops can only exacerbate these problems.

There is moreover widespread distrust of ECX among the trade, regarding grading and underweight, and a perception that the authorised channels of complaint and redress are not fully effective.  This study did not provide either a brief or the scope to investigate this, but it is suggested that confidence might be enhanced if those supporting ECX periodically contract an international company to carry out a thorough operational audit.

The establishment of ECX is a very significant achievement; it involves by far the largest formal commodity trading mechanism in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of the Republic of South Africa, and provides a credible basis for developing a strong WRS.  However, its approach is largely experimental, involving a much higher level of State involvement than is normally in the case with such entities.  For this reason, there is a need to stand back, study its performance and draw lessons for the future development of this or similar initiatives.  There also needs to be much more open discussion and debate, in Ethiopia, about ECX and related policies. 
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The review is conducted by J. Coulter Consulting Ltd., Bromley, UK working under contract to University of Greenwich, UK and funded by the Common Fund for Commodities  


Contact the author at jcoulter01@yahoo.com